ABSTRACT
paradigms and bodies of literature: 1) the regulation of the legal profession in the context of changing roles of inside and outside legal counsel in corporate settings; and 2) the pressures of the context of the corporate lawyer's role, including organizational culture, psychological biases, and lack of financial expertise. The article concludes with propositions for changing the regulation of both the inside and outside corporate legal profession, as well as for lawyers' and corporate officers' education.
THE BANK AND CREDIT UNION DISASTERS IN LITHUANIA: REASONS FOR THE LAWYERS' TORPIDITY
In fall of 2011 the bankruptcy of Snoras, the fifth largest bank in Lithuania, was announced. Barely a year later, in the spring of 2013, the collapse of the sixth largest bank in the country, Ūkio bankas, shattered the fragile financial system of Lithuania, again. From 2012 to 2014 the collapse of four credit unions contributed to customers' distrust in the Lithuanian financial system. These bankruptcies were not a consequence of the recent global financial crisis, but rather a part of the systematic problems mostly unfolding from issues of corporate misconduct. The Young, and others, blew the whistle. It is obvious that these overarching acts of misconduct could not be accomplished without the participation of bank employees and professionals. In comparison with financial chicanery of Enron, which used much more sophisticated financial models to enter transactions considered too risky or controversial and avoid disclosure requirements, the aforementioned patterns of misconduct seem very primitive. But in both cases, despite the vast numbers involved in business and its administration and control professionals and experts, the result was the same: a collapse which saw thousands of employees lose their jobs, and thousands of investors lose their life savings as billions of euros in wealth evaporated.
The disastrous collapse of financial institutions in Lithuania highlights the structural features that permit potentially harmful correlations. Of course, analysis of the situation draws attention to many "longstanding problems, including inadequate disclosure obligations, conflicts of interest, offshore tax havens, and insider trading." 7 But the goal of this article is to scrutinize the lawyers' conduct, because too many members of the legal profession are part of the problem, rather than its solution. 8 In order to execute this analysis, the article analyzes the systematic issues underlying lawyers' perceptions of corporate clients, the ethical pressures for inside and outside corporate lawyers, the impact of psychological biases in organizational culture, and lawyers' lack of financial expertise.
WHO IS A CLIENT?
In terms of legal relations among corporation and lawyer, analysis sets the question of who is the client of the lawyer, because an individual lawyer in the organization usually works with managers of different levels within the client- Especially in emerging economies, it is very common for corporations to "want litigators who will press for every advantage and counselors who will exploit every regulatory loophole". 12 In such business settings it is also a common attitude of managers that, "when lawyers are involved in the business aspects of a deal, they usually yield confusion and wasted time, so "the best way to deal with lawyers is not to deal with them at all." 13 This means that in most cases the corporate client "sets the tone for the ethical behavior of its lawyer: the higher the ethical standard of the client, the better the chances that its lawyers behave ethically."
14
Furthermore, taking into consideration the conventional corporate law and lawyers' ethics rule that lawyers are "expected to maximize the interests and benefits of their corporate clients ..., regardless of potential adverse consequences to others," 15 it becomes inevitable that "allegiance to management's short-term financial interests may compromise obligations to the broader public, as well as to the entity itself." 16 However, the entity, and not its managers, is the lawyer's client, and they owe duty not to the managers, but to the corporation as an entity. The position of the Supreme Court of Lithuania with regards to a limited liability company manager's obligations to the creditors when the company is in financial trouble confirms that the interests of creditors and other stakeholders of the company as an entity shall be balanced with the interests of shareholders. In the 9 Ibid.: 635. 10 Stephen M. However, when the financial state of the company worsens, the fiduciary duty of the director to take into consideration the interests of the creditors emanates. In other words, the worse the financial state of the company, the more weight the interests of the creditors gain in decision-making by the company's executives. This means that, although a company may be an autonomous subject of law and its executives as well as shareholders may act in the name of the company, they do ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014 84
THE ETHICS OF INSIDE LAWYERS
In the study of the legal profession in-house lawyers are now a principal focus of attention
21
, because as legal representatives of the entities they are working for, they face several principal-agent problems. The first problem is in maintaining professional independence. In-house lawyers usually have much at stake, because their job security depends on decisions of organizational management supervisors, which in practice are naturally viewed by legal counsels as their employer. 45 Ibid.: 511. 46 "Subjects were told to focus intently on a challenging cognitive task while watching a video, such as counting the number of times the basketball is passed among people in the video who are wearing white shirts. Once concentrating so heavily on this discrete task, most subjects will not even notice other fairly dramatic things going on in the video-like the presence of someone in a gorilla suit or a lady opening an umbrella-that anyone not engaged in the task would think was impossible to miss" (ibid.: 507). 47 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note 2: 7. 48 "Oftentimes the information necessary for accurate legal analysis is diffused throughout the organization, so that no one has a sufficient knowledge base" (Donald C. Langevoort, supra note 5: 508). 49 Ibid.: 509. 50 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note 2: 11.
LACK OF FINANCIAL UNDERSTANDING
There is no doubt that often even the most well-trained lawyers lack financial expertise, accounting knowledge, and mathematical skills, as well as access and full understanding of risk related data. The complexity of financial products inhibits the ability of lawyers to serve as gatekeepers in situations of corporate collapse. At
Lehman Brothers, for example, it was obvious that the firm was heading toward disaster well before the collapse, but lawyers, with their lack of financial expertise,
were not well positioned to appreciate the gradual changes and to identify financial chicanery until it was too late. 57 Indeed, "many banks are engaged in margin lending to risky borrowers, securing the loans by shares of stock that the borrowers 51 Donald C. Langevoort, supra note 5: 511. 52 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note 2: 11. 53 "The familiar reference here <…> is that frogs will jump out of hot water in which they are placed, but boil to death when put in warm water where the temperature is then gradually raised" (Donald C. Langevoort, supra note 5: 511). 54 Ibid.: 501. 55 Stephen M. Bainbridge, supra note 2: 8. 56 Donald C. Langevoort, supra note 5: 505. 57 Ibid.: 516.
in everyday corporate business practice and in forming patterns for decision making and conduct.
OUTSIDE REGULATION
Lawyers' ethical judgments are usually made in private and possibilities for external observance and monitoring are limited. However, good rules "can encourage individuals to behave in socially defensible ways by framing the interests at issue in terms of accepted moral values." 69 There is no doubt that lawyers are able to "perform a useful gatekeeping role, such as by helping to counter the complacency, conflicts of interest, over-simplification about financial products," 70 but the issue is how exactly they should perform it. Among others, outside auditors and lawyers should function as reputational intermediaries and gatekeepers, policing access to the capital markets. Additionally, "because the gatekeeper's business depends on its reputation for honesty, probity, and accuracy", it will normally not ruin that reputation to aid one client in cheating. 71 Lawyers used to insist that they have duties only to the managers or board of directors of corporate clients, but not to shareholders or the investing public.
Sarbanes-Oxley obligates lawyers to report "evidence of a material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty," first to a company's general counsel, then to its CEO, and ultimately to its board of directors. 77 Many commentators complain that this law will diminish the quality of the attorney's representation of the client because counsel will lack unfettered access to information. 78 So, in this regard the balance between the lawyer's duties of candor and confidentiality is at issue.
73 Deborah L. Rhode and Paul D. Paton, supra note 1: 648. 74 Article 5 of Code of ethics for attorneys sets: "Confidentiality is the most fundamental and important right and duty of the lawyer. The lawyer shall ensure to the client that information provided will be kept as a professional secret." The second and the third part of same article deals with the content of the confidential information and responsibility of attorney's assistants and personnel (Lietuvos Moreover, students should learn how "rudimentary aspects of behavioral psychology that can distort strict economic rationality and foster complacency" 91 and to recognize that business people often have higher risk tolerance. 92 So, if lawyers are potentially to act as gatekeepers, they should learn how to see these appealingly benign traits as potential risk markers.
Furthermore, a better understanding of corporate business and finances can help to avoid oversimplifications with regards to financial instruments; this would broaden students' perspectives, enabling them to better identify and assess consequences.
ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 7, NUMBER 2 2014
93
However, it is unrealistic to expect that a few hours of classroom discussion will alter the values that students have acquired over a lifetime from families, schools, peers, and the general culture. Therefore it is not only the responsibility of universities or professional schools. As one Harvard Business School student put it, "Enron and WorldCom and Tyco didn't happen because CEOs ignored their Aristotle.
[…] They happened because they -like you and I -really wanted to get rich." In contrast to the United States, under Lithuanian legal ethics regulation, attorneys have no incentive to take a gatekeeping role by foreseeing, preventing, and mitigating collapses. As lawyers are a self-regulated profession, it is expected that first the advocates bar's involvement in regulatory reform would contribute to solving the problem. Moreover, as corporate clients are gaining more and more influence and control over lawyers' practices, inside corporate regulation could offer additional tools for encouraging and monitoring lawyers' ethical responsibilities.
Increased curricular attention to legal and business ethics in legal and business education can help to inculcate skills of decision-making that make help lawyers to avoid oversimplifications and to assess non-legal aspects of their work.
